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ABSTRACT 
 
In this short paper, we discuss a dialectic methodology surrounding the 
interpretation of knowledge transfer, and the conditional elements which 
can be seen to support the concept of a unity of knowledge. We discuss a 
differing standpoint to knowledge and knowledge value, based on the 
knowledge transfer practitioner’s perspective, but still in a business context. 
We ask why, if knowledge is vital for business success and competitive 
advantage, the transfer of knowledge is rarely a simple unproblematic event. 
Further, that the creation of knowledge before transfer is recognised as a 
significant factor in determining a starting point for analogous scrutiny, and 
often under a premise of doxastic attitude. This discussion therefore aims to 
synthesise current literature and research into an elemental epistemic 
principal of FIGURATION DYNAMICS, and in doing so, may help focus 
congruent knowledge transfer theories. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
In general terms, we can say that a 
coherent and generally accepted 
working definition of knowledge for 
the organisational environment has 
yet to be established. In this regards, 
Birkinshaw, et al. (2002) suggest that 
in addition to no agreed upon 
definition of knowledge within 
management literature, no 
commonality can be offered 
regarding predictive knowledge 
transfer characteristics. Further, that 
problems associated with knowledge 
transfer are indeed prevalent, as 
knowledge is difficult to define and 
manage as it can be ambiguous, 
unspecific and a dynamic 
phenomenon. This aligns with a view 
from Schultze & Stabell, (2004) and 
concurs with a description of 
philosophical implications regarding 
ideas about the self or personhood, 
from (Shapiro, 2008). 
From a dynamic capacity perspective, 
Parent, et al. (2007) suggest that 
because knowledge is a subjective 
perspective of an individual’s 
experience, associated problems are 
inextricably related to the context of 
the knowledge itself. Therefore, it is 
clear that an individuals past 
experiences related to knowledge, 
and can contribute to retaining this 
knowledge (Sprevak, 2009). As such, 
many key authors focus on ways to 
understand and ultimately enhance 
this knowledge understanding, and in 
doing so, explore various 
propositions, using occidental foci, 
derived from historical secular 
concepts of: positivism (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966). empiricism 
(McCarthy, 2007) ,rationalism 
(Gabbay &  Le  May, 2004) and 
generalist philosophy (Sprevak, 
2009). 
 
In fact, it is clear why most current 
management literature focuses on 
considerations which can be effectual 
in using this knowledge 
understanding to maintain 
competitive advantage. It is only by 
analysing the complete and 
somewhat complex knowledge 
interpretation process, the 
identification of any ‘successful’ 
interaction between practitioners 
during knowledge transfer can be 
identified (Gherardi, 2006). This can 
be simply categorised as relationship 
between the source and the 
recipient; The form and location of 
the knowledge; The recipient’s 
learning predisposition; the source’s 
knowledge-sharing capability; The 
broader environment in which the 
transfer occurs. 
DISCUSSION 
Cachia & Compañó (2007) assert this 
by suggesting that even though 
knowledge cannot readily be 
identified on any balance sheet, it is 
identified as the singularly most 
valuable asset for a business or 
organisation. Therefore, the 
interpretive praxis for knowledge 
schema could be debated at length 
as there is no such thing as ‘normal 
 
Page | 3  
 Contact Author: M.Fascia2@napier.ac.uk 
  Journal of Strategy, Operations & Economics (JSOE). , 2 (1), March 2016 
 
 
JSOE 
©2016 
knowledge’. Aligning to the view 
from Dyer & Hatch, (2006), this 
discussion must therefore consider 
how knowledge philosophy fits within 
the interpretive theoretical overview 
and the formalised description of 
business management, literature on 
this subject is extremely diverse and 
non-definitive. However, for this 
discussion and in the spirit of 
understanding knowledge and 
philosophy, our focus will examine 
why it is important to discover, where 
knowledge is philosophically 
positioned in relation to a business 
context and ultimately from the 
practitioners point of view.  
DEDUCIBLE by INFERENCE 
If we adopt this inference at this 
juncture, it must therefore be as 
equally important to understand the 
significance of experiential reasoning 
behind this interpretive position of 
knowledge before it is transferred 
(Gherardi, 2006). This point of view is 
important because, the adaptation by 
the knowledge transfer practitioners 
involved purport to a position of 
justification in the transfer schema. 
Thus, discussion and examination of 
an overriding epistemic principal is 
required as a baseline for further 
critique of related literature. 
Therefore knowledge taxonomy and 
the types of knowledge related to 
business are discussed along with the 
necessary understanding of 
communication to transfer any 
notion of knowledge (Schultze & 
Stabell, 2004).  
 
FIGURATIONAL TACTIC 
An alternative perspective to this 
absorbent quandary is figurational 
sociology. Figurational sociology 
(process sociology) Elias (1897-1990), 
encompasses dynamic webs of 
human interaction, the emphasis 
being placed on people in the plural 
and how people are tied into social 
networks because of their 
interdependence with each other 
(Elias, 1978). The concept of a 
figuration allows this discussion to 
overcome some of the theoretical 
problems linked with traditional 
sociological terms and theories.  
In particular, misleading dichotomies 
such as those between the individual 
and society, or, ‘agent’ and 
‘structure’. In this respect, Elias (1978), 
noted that it is not productive to 
consider the ‘individual’ and ‘society’ 
as two separate entities, instead, that 
these two concepts refer to 
‘inseparable levels of the same 
human world’ (Murphy et al, 2000, p. 
92). In the context of this discussion , 
process agents are affected by the 
actions of other process agents, who 
are bounded together by 
management structures, overarched 
by expectant outcomes. Additionally, 
(Green, 2003, p. 17), explains that 
people are often influenced and 
affected in a variety of ways by the 
actions of individuals and groups 
whom they may have never met. Elias 
conceptualises the development of 
human knowledge as ‘a continuum 
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along which blends of involvement 
and detachment are located and this 
continuum should be viewed as 
being ‘open’ at both ends. This is 
because, unlike concepts of 
‘affectivity’ and ‘non-affective’ 
(Parsons, 1951; cited in Mennell, 1992), 
or the dualism of ‘objectivity’ and 
‘subjectivity, there is no such thing as 
absolute involvement or detachment, 
thus, there is no ‘zero-point’ 
(Mennell, 1992, p. 160). The 
development of knowledge, 
moreover, is a continuous process 
that is developed and learned by 
people bonded together in complex 
webs of interdependence (Dunning, 
1992; Elias, 1978; Kilminister, 1998). 
Conceptualising the development of 
knowledge in this way, will allow this 
discussion to consider its 
[knowledge] social nature, without 
reinforcing the traditional view that 
all knowledge must be considered as 
either true or false  
As a consequence of this position, 
this approach also engages with the 
question of how an individual derives 
knowledge from either an internal or 
external locus (Marton and Booth 
1997) thus, very importantly, 
eliminating the overarching duality 
problem encountered if a rigid 
‘metric only’ or indeed, ‘figurational 
only’ tactic(s) were adopted.   
Scrutiny at this point reflects egoistic 
conceptions of this reality from a 
knowledge transfer practitioner’s 
perception or cautious belief of any 
experience other than that relative to 
the knowledge transfer scenario 
(Marshall, 2008; Sprevak, 2009). We 
can identify that this is because 
knowledge transfer practitioner’s 
experiential accounts of knowledge 
would be unable to explain the 
putative distinctive value of 
knowledge. A similarly view from Sun 
& Scott (2005), implies that the 
practitioners view of knowledge is 
subjective, any possibly relevant 
mental states are experiential, thus, 
knowledge as images related to 
cognitive content. In fact, to be able 
to adopt a philosophical starting 
point regarding an epistemic 
principal from which to define 
knowledge, knowledge, from both 
perspectives must consist, at least to 
a large extent, in a clarification of 
knowledge value, which does not 
consist in definition alone, and 
therefore must possess a systemic for 
such a clarification using an epistemic 
principal.  
 
KNOWLEDGE EXISTENCE 
As such, Knowledge from this 
perspective, can only exist because 
someone knows it in his mind, (See, 
Polanyi, 1962; 1967) and (Weiskopf, 
2008), Knowledge is not an 
independent entity to be transferred, 
such as any material object might be.  
For example, a chair cannot be 
transferred as knowledge, it is not a 
knowledge. In an attempt to reconcile 
these anomalies studies by Szulanski, 
(2000, p. 10) defines knowledge as a 
‘causally ambiguous set of routines’. 
However, one could ask if the 
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existence of knowledge, which in 
itself depends on the interpretation 
of a foundational normality is true, 
then all knowledge must derive from 
a consequence of foundational ethics 
which in themselves cannot be 
refuted by accepted moral norms.  
 
PROBLEMATIC CRITERIA 
A problem, from a philosophical 
perspective confuses this issue, in 
that, if it is difficult to define the 
experiential primitives, such as 
personal experience, then it will be 
equally difficult to define the primitive 
concepts of knowledge. This suggests 
that the characteristics of knowledge 
acquired by one actor affect 
knowledge creation in another one. 
But, as there is still a disunity in the 
exact definition of knowledge, since 
we have seen that knowledge as a 
‘causally ambiguous set of routines’, 
this seems to contradict the previous 
literature as to why a focus on 
something that is misunderstood 
exists in the first place.  
This situation is a perplexing situation 
to say the least as it implies that our 
knowledge of that real world is fallible 
and theory laden. 
• In general, even though an 
alteration is detected, defining the 
reason why this occurred within the 
perspective of knowledge transfer is 
problematic.  
• Knowledge is given a 
dimension of a 2-point data variation, 
thus, how much one data group 
differentiates from another? 
• knowledge is distorted out of 
context by elements organisational of 
incredulity. Statistical values, on their 
own, cannot make discernible 
distinctions of knowledge within the 
same or apposing data set, therefore, 
cannot determine a perspective 
singularity (figuration) from multiple 
variables. 
 
Knowledge exists but our 
appreciation of it is unclear, is 
singular in its focus and can also 
suffer from borrowed interpretations 
covering many disciplines. Thus, belie 
the potentials inherent in other 
focused research directions. In this 
sense, cognitive interpretations of 
knowledge transfer problems and 
remedies vary, and as such, are often 
very broad or very non-specific.  
DIVERSITY 
As a consequence of this position, the 
diversity surrounding the theoretical 
base of knowledge definition form 
many incongruities and variations, 
perhaps. Thus, relating this position 
to knowledge value, it is important to 
consider different asymmetries, 
which deliberately assume human 
beings hold beliefs in two distinct 
ways. Basic and non-basic, in fact we 
can say that non-basic beliefs are 
based on other beliefs by 
interference, for example ‘I believe 
that all green apples are sweet’, is 
based on my inference that ‘all 
apples are sweet’. Basic beliefs, are of 
course not, for example ‘I believe 
that I am sitting in front of this 
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computer, writing this discussion’, is 
based on my experience I am having 
right now, not by inference of some 
other belief.  
Clearly, there is a fundamental 
problem in aligning these posits 
regarding their usefulness in 
proposing underpinning knowledge 
values or even corrective knowledge 
transfer axioms. Since, both 
positional inferences, presuppose an 
assumption regarding cognitive 
psychology, in that, they both 
require interpretive associations 
regarding knowledge. In this way, 
they inextricably link knowledge and 
knowledge transfer as a cognitive 
process, since if I we endorse this 
axiom then we can endorse both 
hermeneutics and foundationalism. 
This is important as we can therefore 
begin to approach epistemological 
issues regarding the definition of 
knowledge and knowledge value 
from a pragmatic or figurational 
center.   
CONJECTURAL REMARKS 
Philosophically, this view is 
remarkably similar to Kant (see Kant 
‘1781 a critique of pure reason’) for 
whom reason was the categorical 
imperative of freedom and free will.  
However, if one were to adjudicate a 
philosophical position at this point 
one could ask, is it possible to extend 
epistemic knowledge of these 
principals . That is, to make these 
concepts themselves precise and to 
gain comprehensive and secure 
insight about the fundamental 
relations that are present among 
them, moreover, the axioms that 
hold for them. The philosophically 
identifiable positions of knowledge at 
this point can state that any 
knowledge can be experienced, but 
has to be justified as a true belief 
before it can be termed knowledge or 
have any value.  
Similarly, to assume any value or 
relevance to the sender or receiver of 
it the acceptance of the tripartite 
theory of knowledge, Belief, Truth 
and Justification (epistemic principal) 
must also be inferred. It is important, 
at this juncture to also distinguish 
between truth and perceived truth in 
the context of the knowledge 
experience relating to knowledge 
value.  
 
Accordingly, from the standpoint of 
knowledge value, it is important to 
consider the evidence of this 
knowledge when deciding if it is true 
or not, on the basis that the 
knowledge itself has to be better 
understood before it can be 
transferred or if it is simply the 
empirical cogency that has been 
transferred.  
 
FIGURATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
In regards to this view, Elias (1978) 
argues that authority relations will 
inevitably form a central dimension 
(figuration) of interdependency ties 
[amongst departmental staff], as 
‘structural relationships’ (Elias, 1978, 
p. 74). Acknowledging organisations 
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difficult and complex association to 
knowledge (Thompson and 
Walsham, 2004), examine the link 
between individual’s experiences and 
knowledge transfer phenomena in a 
organisation environment. This is an 
important focal underpinning for this 
discussion, as although studies by 
Cook & Brown (1999), examine the 
useful collaboration of knowledge 
and social interaction, to date there 
exists little evidence to draw upon 
which tests relationship synergy 
between figurational sociology 
{figurations} (Elias, 1978) and complex 
knowledge transfer relationships.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This discussion has focused on 
outlining and assessment of current 
and historical knowledge philosophy, 
theory and positioning, but at the 
same time, places it within the realms 
of a business context. It concentrated 
on the epistemic principal of 
knowledge and indicated that a 
figurational principal of knowledge is 
equally important. This is because,  at 
its core, knowledge transfer is 
concerned with the process of 
moving useful knowledge from one 
place to another.  
We determine that at present there is 
no consolidated definition of 
knowledge or knowledge transfer in 
a business context .... or any other for 
that matter.  
Consequently, there is still a need to 
identify if there are any alternative 
more useful perspectives to 
knowledge and knowledge transfer, 
specifically relating to business 
practices, success and competitive 
advantage. Ultimately, we conclude, 
a figurational approach may be 
worth consideration. 
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